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I. Introduction
Numerous heterodox analyses of the Great Recession exist.1 While most contributions
integrate the role of financial capitalists, their role is typically limited to the creation of asset
bubbles and the resulting financial crises. The integration of financial capitalists is rarely
grounded in adversarial class relations, but alternatively in the liberalization of the financial
sector. In contrast, this paper considers the nexus of coercive power relations between labor (L),
industrial capitalists (IK) and financial capitalists (FK) and their impact on dynamic
macroeconomic performance in the Neo-liberal (NL) era.
In particular, a finance capital-dominated profit-led accumulation regime is modelled in
which FK are primarily responsible for a squeeze of IK profits2 and secondarily for reductions in
labor’s share of income and unintended asset bubbles that act as a temporary countervailing
tendency to a FK profit squeeze (PS) and under-consumption crisis. These dynamics are captured
by extending Goodwin’s (1967) two class predator-prey model to include the impact of a threeway class/power struggle over the distribution of income.
The primary purpose of this paper is to: 1) introduce a three-class predator-prey model
with class interactions consistent with the NL era into the literature; 2) analyze the spectrum of

*The author benefited from productive conversations with Bill Gibson and Mary Lou Zeeman. He is also grateful
for the research assistance provided by Christian Filter.
1
For example, see Kotz (2013, 2015), Glyn(2007), Crotty(2003), Turner(2008) and Foster and McChesney (2012).
2
This squeeze of profits is qualitatively distinct from a reserve army profit squeeze but is not necessarily mutual
exclusive of such a profit squeeze.

different qualitative macroeconomic behaviors associated with the model; 3) focus on two
particular outcomes – FK PS and a double reserve army (RA) – FK PS –both capable of
producing cyclical and chaotic outcomes; and 4) use the FK PS to explain key stylized facts
associated with the NL period. Given a sparing behavioral structure for the model where
financial markets are not explicitly specified3, a full-on calibration exercise is not attempted.
A well-developed literature on the historical succession of regimes of accumulation
exists. A subset of that literature (Bowles et al. (1990), Goldstein (2000), Gutierrez-Bargarrusa
(2019; p. 1307) Jaffee (2019; pp.193-6), and Weisskopf et al. (1985)) cite evidence of cycles
between alternative accumulation regimes that underlie the difficulty in achieving balanced
growth/expansion within capitalism. A succession of a profit-led (unregulated) regime
supplanted by a wage-led (regulated) regime with their respective crisis-producing mechanisms
of under-consumption and RA PS crises highlight the difficulty in achieving long-term balanced
growth. Each regime ends as a result of an unbalanced increase in the power of one of the main
productive classes. Yet, however inefficient, in the long-run the conditions for profitable
accumulation are re-established by a transition between regimes.
The fundamental distinction in a FK-dominated profit-led regime is that the crisis
combines the worst of both alternative regimes. Growth is brought to a standstill by a FK PS that
lowers investment and by an under-consumption crisis when deficiencies in labor’s income can
no longer be overcome by debt accumulation.

3

Only the redistribution of income from L and IK to FK is considered, but a linkage is made from FK income to
increases in wealth via an implicit channel. It is assumed that FK income used to trade on their own accounts
increases asset prices and thus wealth.
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The most popular extension of two species predator-prey models includes a superpredator along with a predator and a prey. The super-predator preys on both other species and
faces no predation (regulation). In this paper, FK is the super-predator. In general, crises are
endemic to such models. The unregulated coercive competitive forces operating among superpredators can lead to the excessive depopulation of other classes. While this behavior has long
been recognized in the biology/ecology literature, I refer to it as the super-predator paradox or in
our case, the FK paradox. This is especially problematic when the super-predator is primarily an
unproductive element of society. As a result, one possible outcome is a long period of stagnant
growth. Attempts to strengthen one of the productive classes without reducing the power of the
super-predator, can result in more destabilizing behavior. For example, progressive attempts to
strengthen L without weakening FK, can result in a double RA- FK PS with short-lived chaotic
economic performance.4
Our simulated results show that a three-class model substantially expands the possible
accumulation regimes and crisis mechanisms that can be analyzed. Both wage-led, profit-led and
modified regimes such as a FK dominated profit-led regime can be studied. In addition, underconsumption, FK PS, RA PS and a double FK-RA PS can impede accumulation/growth. Thus,
the three class model is versatile.
The paper focuses on the historically relevant FK PS and FK-RA PS and reveals that,
under relevant parameter values, cyclically volatile behavior in the form of transient chaos, limit
cycles and long-lasting damped cycles are likely outcomes. In general, the volatile disruption of

4

The short-term nature of the chaos is associated with a destabilized limit cycle that experiences
turbulence/bursts as a result of a combination of a fundamental fast cycle and a sub-harmonic slow cycle.
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high employment equilibriums or turbulent depressed equilibriums or in a growth context (not
considered) the hinderance of balanced growth are associated with severe imbalances in power
relations across the three classes. Of particular relevance is that substantial increases in FK
power have major negative consequences on macro performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the salient
stylized macroeconomic facts associated with the NL era. Section III develops the differential
equation model and the supporting expenditure-income (employment) model along with the
simplifying assumptions invoked. A base unbounded three equation/class DEQ model is
specified followed by a four-equation model with upper and lower bounding of state variables.
The latter incorporates an additional macroeconomic state variable, wealth, as a means of placing
a lower bound on expenditures and hence employment. Section IV addresses the qualitative
behavior associated with the unbounded model based on simulated solutions. Section V presents
the qualitative results from the bounded model with emphasis on the FK-RA PS and the FK PS.
Section VI reports the results of sensitivity analysis and Section VII contains concluding
comments.
II. Stylized Facts
Analysts of the US economy in the NL era focus on various stylized facts. The type of
variables, considered are: 1) indices of shifts in power relations between L, IK and FK; 2) profit
rate decompositions including labor/profit share of income, technical ratios and capacity
utilization; 3) the intensification of international competition; 4) the composition of expenditures
as shares of aggregate demand; and 5) private debt and wealth.

4

Relevant to the model developed, the salient facts are: 1) the weakening of L vis a vis IK;
2) the absolute and relative rise to power of FK with respect to IK; 3) the unexpected, for a
profit-led regime, rise (decline) in consumption (investment) as a share of aggregate demand;
and 4) increases in private debt facilitated by increases in wealth, via asset bubbles, that underlie
the rise in the consumption share.
Given that 1) is well documented, only the resultant secular decline in the labor share of
income is considered. The shift in power between FK and IK is demonstrated through a
comparison of the IK gross profit share of income and the profit share net of payments to FK. 5
In addition, the trend in consumption share is shown along with the trajectory of real wealth6.
Finally, the ratio of consumption to investment which tracks the relative change in each share of
GDP is reported. The data from 1980-2012 are summarized in Figure 1, respectively in panels ad. Variable definitions and data sources are contained in Appendix A.
In Figure 1, panel A shows the well-documented secular decline in the labor share of
income (µ).7 From 1980-2015, µ declines from .58 to .52. Typical cyclical fluctuations are also
present. Cyclical increases in µ are considered, for the most part, to be weak so as not to support
a cyclical RA PS (Goldstein (1999) and Boddy and Crotty (2018)). Although, Basu et al. (2013)
and Boddy and Crotty (2018) conclude that the cyclical RA PS is operational in at least one of

5

Bezrah and Goldstein (2013) use a liberal, but defensible, definition of the IK profit share that is net of net
dividends, net stock purchases, and net interest payments.
6
Debt is not explicitly considered in the model but is rather captured by increases in wealth that allow for
expanded debt limits.
7
Alternative measures of labor share show the same trend. See Giandrea and Sprague (2017).
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the NL cycles.8 This finding is relevant because it lends credence to the practical possibility of
a double FK-RA PS that is addressed in our model.
Panel B displays the IK profit share of income prior to and net of net interest, dividends
and stock purchases. The recovery of the gross profit share from its decline during the latter
stages of the Golden Age is evident. This is consistent with a profit-led accumulation regime.
While numerous authors have emphasized the rise in FK income9, none have calculated its
impact on the IK profit share. The net share accomplishes this. The widening gap between the
gross and net shares in panel B and the downward trend in the net share capture important
aspects of the absolute rise to power of FK and more importantly, the relative power shift
between IK and FK. 10
Thus, net of coercive transfers of profit, the IK profit share did not recover and has
continued to decline. In other words, FK captured more than the total gains made from increases
in the rate of labor exploitation. The gap between the two graphs represents FK share of income
(f). This upward trend in f is what I refer to as the FK PS.11
Panel C shows the share of GDP going to consumption c and real wealth in trillions of
dollars. The well-documented increase in c is substantiated. Given the damping effect of a

8

Basu et al. (2013) find that the RA PS is generally operable throughout the period. Boddy and Crotty (2018) argue
that a RA PS occurs in the 1990s cycle. They are unable to determine if a PS occurs during the 2001-2007 cycle due
to the start of the financial crisis.
9
See Crotty (2003, 2008), Turner (2008) and Glyn (2007), Kotz (2015) and Foster and McChesney(2012).
10
Numerous papers by Crotty (2003, 2008, 2009) clearly express the adversarial/coercive nature of these transfers.
Analyses of the profit rate that do not consider the impact of transfers, such as in Kotz (2013), are likely to
underestimate the role of profitability problems as a cause of the Great Recession. Oftentimes this oversight is
associated with the view that such transfers are voluntary/non-coercive.
11
In contrast, Bezrah and Goldstein (2013) show that f remains basically constant during the regulated capitalism
regime.
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decline in IK net profit share on I and FK innovation and speculative trading responsible for
asset bubble-induced wealth effects on C, c has risen dramatically. The wealth data pinpoints
three asset bubbles (mid-late 1980s and mid 2000s housing price bubbles and the late 1990s Dot
Com bubble) that correspond with more rapid increases in c. These bubbles also correlate well
with increases in f.
Finally, panel D depicts the ratio of C to investment expenditures (I) as the C-I ratio. The relative
behavior of the I share in the NL era is the least agreed upon fact among researchers. Some
authors (Kotz (2013, 2015) and Turner(2008)) analyze an over-I crisis, while others favor either
under-I (Glyn(2007)) or a mixture depending on the composition of industries considered.12 The
C-I ratio increases from 1980-1991 and 2001-2006 and declines from 1992-2000. The rise
corresponds with increases in f and the occurrence of asset bubbles. The decline is related to the
long I-led expansion of the 1990s that includes the Dot-Com bubble, but also a decline in f that
created a more conducive I environment.
The relative rise in C share prior to the Great Recession is indicative of wealth-induced
increases in c as an offsetting crisis tendency in an environment with relatively damped I
activity.
Given the salient stylized facts, we turn to a model capable of explaining these outcomes.

12

Crotty’s (2003) analysis of the NL regime considers global excess capacity created by international competitioninduced defensive I spending. Crotty and Goldstein (1992a, 1992b) and Goldstein (2009) develop a model of the
firm’s I decision that has increasing I as competition rises and decreasing I with respect to transfers of profit to FK
increases.
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Figure 1. Stylized Facts
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III. Predator-Prey Models
This section develops a base three class predator-prey model and also an
extended/bounded model. The extended model includes a fourth DEQ.
Goodwin’s two class- two differential equation (DEQ) model includes an equation for the
relative power shifts between IK and L. The second equation captures changes in a macro state
variable, the degree of full employment (v), in response to the relative power between classes.
The three class/three DEQ model contains two equations for relative shifts in the balance
of power between three classes (IK, L, FK) and a third for the same macro state variable. One
equation models how power relations between all three classes affect labor share of income (µ),
while the other considers how IK-FK relations impacts FK share of income (f) and hence the net
IK share, (1-µ-f). The equation of motion for v, is determined by imbalances in a short-term
expenditure-income framework where expenditures depend on the state variables rather than
from a growth framework.13 In the model below, FK is the super predator, while IK is the
predator and L the prey.14
In contrast to Goodwin’s model, the current model is more flexible. This occurs on two
levels: 1) the qualitative behavior of state variable trajectories; and 2) the nature of class
interactions. With respect to the former, Goodwin’s model is confined to limit cycle behavior
and for the latter, L is viewed as the predator of profits. Since three DEQs are a necessary

13

Tobin (1975) marries an E=Y model within a DEQ model to derive stability conditions for Keynesian short-run
dynamics.
14
The roles of IK and L can easily be reversed on the basis of different parameter values. The analysis below
considers both the case of strong and weak labor vis a vis IK.
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condition for chaos, chaotic results are possible in our model assuming that dynamics are
sufficiently bounded globally.15 Additionally, limit cycles and damped cycles are possible.
On the second level, Table 1 summarizes different types of class interactions and
resulting behaviors possible in the model. In the table, the > symbol refers to the dominance
(predation) of one class over (by) another. The table only considers cases where FK dominates L
(FK>L). A variety of class dynamics and outcomes are feasible.

Table 1. Power Relations and Possible Outcomes
CLASS RELATIONS

POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

IK>L, IK>FK and FK>L

Profit-led growth with FK as servant and possible Underconsumption crisis

IK>L, FK>IK and FK>L

FK dominated profit-led regime with FK profit squeeze and
possible under-consumption crisis

L>IK, FK>IK and FK>L

Wage-led growth with a double RA-FK squeeze of profits

L>IK, IK>FK and FK>L

Wage-led growth with a RA profit squeeze

In the analysis below, the likelihood of under-consumption problems are minimized by
incorporating household borrowing to sustain consumption and wealth-induced consumption as

15

Goodwin (1991) adds an ad hoc dynamic control variable in the form of a DEQ for government policy and
demonstrates that chaotic behavior can result. Here, chaos can result more naturally from the endogenous
interactions between classes.
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offsetting tendencies. It is not until a significant decline in wealth occurs ( via a pseudo bubble
burst) 16 that under-consumption appears.
With respect to boundedness and stability, the model developed does not readily fit the
typology of three-species predator-prey models for which analytical results have been
established.17 Thus, general results are not available. Results of interest are generated from
numerical simulations.

a. Underlying Model Assumptions
For simplicity, FK are integrated as unproductive economic agents. All FK income are
transfers from either profit or wages or both. While the model is amenable to treating both FK
fiduciary and intermediary roles, interest income is not explicitly modelled. Thus, FK income is
transferred from IK in the form of stock buybacks and dividend payouts. The implications for
income shares are that µ + (1-µ) (labor share plus the gross IK profit share) exhaust total income
and µ + (1-µ-f) +f =1. FK income is divided between limited FK consumption and trades made
on FK accounts.18 Given the large percentage of FK income devoted to speculative trading, f is
linked to wealth via presumed asset demand-induced price increases.

16

Given the difficulties of integrating a discontinuous bubble collapse into a continuous model, only continuous
cycles in wealth are modelled.
17
Krikorian (1979) develops general boundedness and stability conditions for thirty-four variants of the threespecies model including variants based on particular parameter ranges.
18

The unproductiveness of FK activity, implies that all such trades are made in secondary markets.
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Taking unemployment and excess capacity as typical, we make production/supply-side
assumptions to establish a linkage between demand-induced increases in supply (Y) and the
degree of full employment, v.19 Assuming fixed coefficients, constant returns to scale
production, a given percent increase in supply will increase v by the same percentage. Thus
Ẏ

v̇
v

=

where variables with dots are time derivatives.

Y

Further assumptions are addressed in the model presentation.
The formal model consists of three DEQs for µ, f, and v and an associated incomeexpenditure model.

b. Three Class Predator-Prey Model
An equation of motion for labor share of income, µ, is as in Goodwin (1967) with the
addition of a third term capturing the impact of FK on µ.
µ̇
µ

=-ϒ + ρ1 v – ρ2f

(1)

where v is the degree of full employment, f is FK share of income and ϒ, ρ1 and ρ2 are positive
constants. Equation (1) captures the conflict between IK and FK vs. L over µ. ϒ is the negative
trend in µ from secular declines in trade union density, labor market deregulation and the
weakening of labor legislation to mention a few. ρ1 v considers shifts in the IK-L balance of
19

It should be noted that in a short-run model with fixed labor supply and constant productivity, the only
V̇

determinant of is the percentage change in employment.
V
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power associated with the bargaining power of labor determined by the RA. Boddy and Crotty
(2018) and Goldstein (1999) empirically establish that this effect has been significantly
weakened during the NL era. Combinations of ϒ and ρ1 model a continuum of the relative power
of L vs. IK. In addition, weakened cyclical effects (ρ1 small) allow for a more secular focus.20
The relative strength of L vs. FK is in ρ2 f. As f increases, the political and economic
sway of FK increases. This facilitates FK occupation of corporate board positions, influence over
corporate policy, implementation of cost rationalization strategies (downsizing, use of contingent
labor, etc.) and financing of capital flight all of which impact µ.21 More importantly, ρ2 f
indirectly models the IK response to declining net profits through low road labor strategies.
Equation (2) models the interactions between IK and FK primarily through the
shareholder value channel.
ḟ
f

= - α0 +α1 (1-µ) +α2 v

(2)

where α0, α1, and α2 are positive constants. α0 includes exogenous influences on f such as
financial regulation/deregulation that limit IK transfers unrelated to the level of profits. The 1-µ
and v terms represent profit available for transfer broken respectively into per-unit profitability
and the scale of profitable units. More FK influence/power, as measured by f, translates to larger
profit claims in the form of coerced higher dividends, stock buybacks and monopoly pricing on

20

Given asymmetries in regaining (relinquishing) power after secular declines (gains), a more appropriate
specification could include an asymmetric response where ρ1 takes on different values for v̇><0. This extension is
beyond the scope of this paper.
21
For a summary of the theoretical FK and NL channels for the secular decline in µ, see Barradas (2019).
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financial innovations supplied to IK. In this base model, FK claims on IK profits are not limited.
In the bounded model, they are restricted.
Adjustments to the macroeconomic state, v, are determined by imbalances between
income share-determined aggregate demand and perfectly elastic aggregate supply. Thus,
v̇
v

=

Ẏ
Y

= A(µ,f) [c(µ,f) + i(µ,f) + g – 1]

(3)

where Y is the level of production/income, A is the Keynesian multiplier and c, i, and g are
𝑐 𝐼

respectively the consumption, investment and government expenditure shares of Y ( , , and
𝑦 𝑌

𝑔 22
).
𝑦

A is endogenously determined by income shares. In the simple model without bounding, G

policy is excluded (G =0)).

c. The Income-Expenditure Model
The expenditure model includes a class-based Keynesian consumption function and a
Marxian equation for the accumulation of capital. A three-class consumption function takes the
following form,
C = β0 + βL µ Y + βIK (1-µ-f) Y + βFK f Y

Ẏ

22

A more familiar form of equation (3) is derived from Ẏ = A(µ,f) [E(µ,f) – Y] and = A(µ,f) [E(µ,f)/Y – 1].
Y
Under our production function assumptions, the existence of excess capacity and E = C + I + G,
v̇
v

=

Ẏ
Y

= RHS EQ (3).
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where all β are positive constants. Under the simplifying assumption that all profits are invested
(βIK = 0), the economy-wide marginal propensity to consume is βLµ + βFK f. The class-based C
function is modified to include both L attempts to preserve its historical level of C through
borrowing and an economy-wide wealth effect. Thus,
C = β0 + βL µ Y + βFK f Y + β1 (μ* – μ) Y + β2 W

(4)

where μ* is a socially and historically acceptable L share, (μ* – μ) is the share deficit, W is real
wealth and β1 and β2 are constants.
Share deficit C spending is assumed to be debt financed. Interest payments on this debt
are not considered, but the impact of debt on net worth (W) is considered in the extended model.
In the base model, the wealth effect is not considered (β2 = 0).
The share deficit term, neutralizes tendencies to under-consumption from declining µ
making it more likely that a profit-led regime exists.23 Thus, reductions in wealth are the primary
channel for C to decline.
A Marxian equation for the accumulation of capital is
𝐼
𝐾

= 𝑍1 (1 − 𝜇 − 𝑓)

𝑌
𝐾

where K is the capital stock, Z1 is a constant often set equal to 1. Thus, the rate of accumulation
equals the net profit rate. Under the assumption of a constant

𝐾
𝑌

ratio,

23

When βL = β1 and μ increases or decreases by a unit, the marginal impact on C is zero. Even when βL and β1 are
not equal, the marginal effect is significantly less than if β1 = 0. For reasonable parameter values ∂Y/∂μ < 0
(condition for an I-led regime).
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𝐼 𝑌
𝑌𝐾

=

𝐼
𝐾

𝑍1 (1 − μ − f)

Y
K

and 𝐼 = 𝑍1 (1 − μ − f) Y

Modifying I to include exogenous influences and a potential wealth effect,24
I = Z0 + Z1 (1-μ-f) Y+Z2 W

(5)

where Z0 and Z2 are positive constants.
Fiscal policy, not integrated in the base model, is based on closing
recessionary/inflationary gaps,

G = (v* - v)

𝑌𝑓
𝐴e

(6)

where v* is the target level of v, YF the full employment level of Y, v YF = Y and Ae is an
expectation of the endogenous multiplier.
Equations (4-6) when divided on both sides by Y to generate c, i and g are substituted
into equation (3) to complete the three DEQ model. 25
The base model is constituted by equations (1-2) and equation (3) with c, i and g
substituted in with the following restrictions: g=0, βIK = 0, Z1 = 1 and β2 = Z2 = 0.
Parameters that determine relative class positions are: ϒ, ρ1, ρ2 directly and ρ1 vs. α2
indirectly for IK vs. L, ρ2 directly and α1, α0 and ρ1 vs. α2 indirectly for FK vs. L and α0- α3
directly and ρ1 vs. α2 indirectly for IK vs. FK. In addition, W0 and W1 (introduced below) affect

24

In simulations, the possibility that I falls below depreciation I should be considered. Fortunately, in our
simulations, it was not necessary to impose this floor on I.
25

Note that

𝑌𝑓
𝑌

1

= and when g≠0, that g= g(v) and thus, A = A(u,f,v).
𝑣
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the absolute position of FK. When initial conditions are considered, f (0) affects IK vs. L and
FK vs. IK, while μ(0) impacts IK vs. FK and FK vs. IK via the interactions terms in the time
derivative variant of the three equations.
While the basic model suppresses under-consumption tendencies (β2 ≠ 0), it captures
various profit squeezes (RA, FK and FK-RA). The underlying dynamics of the FK PS outcome
are considered. Starting from a secular decline in µ, IK gross profits rise. This redistribution has
minimal impact on C as L borrows to offset the share deficit, while an I-led expansion results
causing v to rise. While the effects of v on µ are relatively small, the secular increase in 1-µ and
v increase f. This process repeats itself until increases in f overrun the gains in the gross profit
share. At a critical juncture, net IK profit share is squeezed and I declines bringing v down.
Whether the economy cycles or crashes depends on bounding mechanisms in the model.
𝐶

Here, small ∂C/∂µ implies that C plays a bigger role in sustaining the expansion (𝑌 rises).
As v declines from deficient I and f rises proportionately more than µ declines, I declines and v
declines further. As long as the rise in f and/or the decline in I is unbounded, the economy will
decline precipitously.
Such a dynamic is exemplary of the super-predator/FK paradox. In more practical terms,
unregulated FK activities result in undesirable outcomes in the form of an economy-wide crash.
d. Four Differential Equation Bounded Model
This likely outcome segues to a discussion of a bounded model. An FK PS induced crash
is less likely if the upward tendency in f and significant declines in I and v are bounded. This is

17

respectively accomplished via 1) a quadratic restriction on 𝑓̇, 2) the addition of a wealth effect
influenced by pseudo FK-induced asset bubbles26 and 3) stabilizing G policy.
With respect to 1) above, equation (2) is modified and renumbered (2’ ).
𝑓̇

= − α0 + α1 (1 − 𝜇) + 𝛼2 𝑣 − 𝛼3 (1 − 𝜇)2

𝑓

(2’ )

where α3 is a positive constant.
The squared term limits FK incursions on IK profits. 27 Thus, a continual rise in f
underlying the FK paradox is limited and possibly reversed.
Wealth is treated as a second macro state variable.
Ẇ
W

= W0 +W1 f - W2 f 2 +(1-βL )μ

Y
W

- β1 (μ* - μ)

Y
W

(7)

where W0 – W2 are positive constants and the last two terms represent household saving and
dissaving as changes in W. W0 includes the typical return on invested wealth.
The quadratic dependency of W on f limits the use of FK income for the purchase of
secondary market assets and the price of those assets (at a given level of Y). The f2 term accounts
for an eventual tapering and decline in asset prices. Combined with the activation of the W effect
in the C and I equations (β2 > 0 and Z2 > 0), asset bubble-induced increases in W reduce the
decline in I and result in (unsustainable) increases in C.

26
27

Given that asset prices are not explicitly modelled, I use the term pseudo.
An example would be limits on corporate stock buybacks.
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Lastly, the use of stabilizing fiscal policy as in Equation (6) (G ≠ 0) places a possible
upper and lower bound on v.28
The complete four DEQ bounded/extended model consists of equations (1, 2’, 3 and 7)
with β2 > 0, Z2 > 0, G as in equation (6), βIK = 0, and Z1 = 1. The dynamics of the model are
similar to the basic model with both upper and lower bounding of the solution. Thus, instead of a
likely crash, cyclical and chaotic outcomes are more likely.

IV. Qualitative Behavior: Unbounded Three Class Model
a. Underlying Dynamics
Unlike Goodwin’s two class model that results in a stable limit cycle, the basic model is
more likely to result in either equilibrium trajectories or unstable trajectories emanating from
saddle points. This characteristic is desirable in explaining underlying secular trends.
In comparison to the Goodwin model, the major differences are an E=Y model29 versus a
𝑣̇

growth framework for the macro state and the addition of a third class. In Goodwin, 𝑣 is
determined by the profit rate (πR) minus the sum of productivity and labor supply growth rates.
Thus, a decline in πR from an increase in μ, does not translate to an immediate decline in v until

28

Results below indicate that this type of policy is both bounding but also destabilizing. Typical state variable
amplitudes increase. Thus, a dynamic control variable would be a better policy specification but would complicate
the current model unnecessarily.
29
An advantage of an E=Y model are: 1) the complexity of the macro model can be developed outside of the
differential equation model which is more sensitive to complex specifications.
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∂v <
πR falls below the sum of the growth factors such that ∂μ 0. 30 In contrast this derivative is
>

strictly <0 here. With respect to Goodwin’s 𝜇̇ equation, equation (1) is the same with the
exception that it includes a (-ρ2 f) term associated with a third class.
Consider a typical expansion in both models. Eventually as v rises enough, μ increases
𝜕𝑣

but given the differences in 𝜕𝜇, v continues to increase in Goodwin, but declines in our case
unless offset by the behavior of a third class. In Goodwin, μ rises enough over multiple periods
to cause πR and v to decline which ultimately results in a multi-period fall in μ and a revival in v.
In our case, a small decline in v is enough to make μ decline and v rise. A slight rise in v
reverses the process and results in rapid saw tooth behavior in v and μ that either continues or
reaches equilibrium. It is only by the addition of a third class that qualitatively different behavior
results. The possible qualitative outcomes are varied and conditioned by the relative strength of
the three classes. These outcomes are considered below.
For example, consider relatively strong FK vis a vis IK and L. In the expansion, as μ first
declines and v rises, by equation (2’), f also declines till -α0 is overcome. Thus, (1-μ-f) increases
and v rises as long as

𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝜇

< 0. If f is slower to rise than μ (depending on ϒ vs. α0 and ρ1 vs. α2),

(1-μ-f ) and v continue to rise. Eventually, μ and f both rise and (1-μ-f) and v decline.31 As f
rises faster, eventually (1-μ-f) decreases by enough that f declines. Here, the increase in 1-μ is

30

Goodwin’s v dynamics could be replicated by subtracting the sum of growth factors from equation (3). Despite
this, investment is still treated differently than in Goodwin as only having demand side impacts.
31
Depending on whether f is falling slowly at this juncture, μ can continue to rise at the same time that IK net
profits and v fall via a reverse cost rationalization effect.
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not enough to compensate for the rise in f and a sawtooth response is avoided. As a result, (1-μ-f)
continues to decline and v falls to a depressed equilibrium or crashes as a result of an FK PS
crisis.32 For later, it is important to note that in some circumstances f lags μ dynamically.
b. Qualitative Behavior
Qualitative behavior is related to the relative power among the three classes. Table 2
summarizes seven alternative nexuses of class power that result in five different behaviors.
References to the power of bi-lateral class relations as strong, moderate and weak are relative
strengths.
Table 3 presents the parameter values associated with each case in Table 2 . Case 1 is the
base with parameter values reported in the first column. Subsequent columns contain only the
values of parameters that have been altered with respect to the base case. Blank cells indicate
that a parameter retains its base case value. Figure 2 depicts the state trajectories (μ,v,f) and the
time path for (1-u-f) for the five different qualitative behaviors. Parameterization of the model is
derived from a rudimentary econometric analysis of behavioral relations reported in Appendix B.
Cases 1 and 2 exhibit our primary focus of this paper – an FK PS. In case 1 (2), the
relationship between L vs. IK, FK vs. IK and FK vs. L are respectively weak, strong and strong
(weak). These relations are consistent with a FK dominated profit-led regime. The dynamics of
the system capture a FK PS crash. In case 1 (depicted in Figure 1), the economy crashes to v=0.
This result is characteristic of the super-predator paradox.

32

This result is predicated on relatively weak L vs. IK where a small value for ρ1 ensures that f increases at a faster
rate than μ declines.
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In Figure 1, case 1, it takes 19 periods for the economy to bottom. Using more realistic
earmarks, it takes 10 periods for μ to decline an amount equivalent to its drop between 19802015. This suggests that each time period is approximately 3.5 years. At t=10, states values are
(v=.37, μ=.52, f=.71, (1-u-f) = -.23) and c=.85 compared to the initial states/values respectively
of (.9,.6,.042,.358) and c=.62. These trajectories follow the stylized trends highlighted in section
II.33
G policy, as specified in equation (6), slows the decline but not the crash in the economy
(not depicted). With policy, v reaches .001 at t=25 instead of t=22 in case 1. At t=10, the state
vector is (.85, .52, .80, -.32) suggesting that in the short-run, policy slows the decline in the
economy but is eventually overwhelmed. In addition, policy aids the ascent of f.

Table 2. Qualitative Behaviors in Unbounded Three Class Model
Case
1
2
3
4

L vs. IK
Weak
Weak
Strong
Strong

FK vs. L
Strong
Weak
Weak
Weak

Moderate

FK vs. IK
Strong
Strong
Moderate
Moderate
Strong
Moderate
Strong
Weak

5

Strong

6
7

Moderate

Weak

Weak

Strong
Strong

Outcome
FK Profit Squeeze Crash
FK Profit Squeeze Crash
RA Profit Squeeze – Stable Equilibrium
Double RA-FK Profit Squeeze to RA Profit
Squeeze Stagnant Equilibrium
Double RA-FK Profit Squeeze to FK Profit
Squeeze Crash
Investment-Led Expansion to Stagnant Equilibrium
with Under-C problem
Wage-Led Expansion with Stable Equilibrium
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These outcomes are not very sensitive to borrowing by L to sustain C. For β 2 = 0 and β2 =1, at t=10 the two state
vectors are respectively: (.35, .52, .70, -.22) and (.38, .52, .72, -.24) suggesting that L borrowing effects to maintain
C are quantitatively small.
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Table 3. Parameter Values for Unbounded Model Cases 1-734
Parameter
ϒ

Case 1
0.004

ρ1

Case 3
0.0035

Case 4
0.0035

Case 5
0.0035

Case 6

Case 7

0.00003

0.004

0.007

0.007

0.006

0.004

ρ2

0.05

0.005

0.005

0.04

α0

0.15

0.13

0.13

α1

0.9

0.32

0.4

0.4

0.001

0.5

α2

0.1

0.0001

0.001

0.01

0.0005

0.005

Z0

700

Z1

1.0

β0

1500

β1

0.75

β2

0.75

βFK

0.02

μ*

0.6

YF

10000

v*

(0.90)

Ae

(0.40)

Initial
conditions
μ(0)

0.6

f(0)

0.042

v(0)

0.9

Case 2

0.000001

0.0008

0.4

0.0

0.75 and

0.40 and

0.60 and

(0.0)

(0.00 -1.00)

(0.20)

0.0
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Values in parentheses are not used in the main simulation. They are used in additional sub-cases discussed in the
text.
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Case 2 with FK weakened against L and no policy exhibits qualitatively similar behavior
to case 1. In this scenario, the decline is slowed and the ultimate crash (v=.001) occurs at t=25.
At t=10, the state vector is (.61, .54, .33, .12). Thus, the decrease in FK power softens the early
decline in v, marginally slows the decent in μ, more substantially deters the rise of f and thus the
decline in IK net profits.
Turning to a stable RA profit squeeze, reported as case 3, L is significantly strengthened
versus IK and FK and FK remains moderately strong with respect to IK, a RA profit squeeze
occurs.35
The strength of L vs. IK is expressed by ϒ and ρ1. Here, f→0, 𝜇̇ > 0 until v equilibrium
(ve) (v=.875). While an unemployment rate of 12.5 percent may seem excessive prior to a fall in
μ, the relevant conceptual rate should be a broad measure of unemployment such as U6 which is
often double the official rate.36
Case 3 considers a stable secular RA profit squeeze with an acceptable equilibrium that
includes an endogenous decline in f. As f→0, an effective floor is placed under IK net profits
allowing the economy to prosper. The equilibrium state vector is (v=.875, u=.70, f=0, 1-μ-f=.30).
Determining the time scale as above, t = .21/.25 years. Thus, the expansion in v is approximately
5.75 years. During the first 200 periods, while f > 0 but declining, the increase in μ is aided by a
reversal of the ρ2 f effect.

35

Given that μ>μ* in equilibrium, results are simulated for both β2=.75 and β2=0. The former results are reported.
In that case, debt retirement reduces C and mildly bounds the outcomes, but the results are qualitatively the same
in both cases. For β2 = 0, the equilibrium state vector is (v=1, μ=.887, f=0, 1-μ-f=.123) and v peaks at 1.28. after a
15.8 - 18.0 year expansion.
36
U6 is used in the econometric estimation of parameters along with U3.
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Figure 2. Unbounded Model Cases
CASE 1. FK PS

CASE 2. FK PS WEAKENED FK

CASE 3. RA PS

CASE 4. FK-RA PS WITH TRANSITION TO RA PS
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CASE 5. FK-RA PS WITH TRANSITION TO FK PS

CASE 6. I-LED EXPANSION WITH UNDER-CONSUMPTION

CASE 7. WAGE-LED EXPANSION
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In this case, where FK ultimately has no impact on the distribution of income, a more
stable and acceptable outcome results despite having strong L in a profit-led regime.
Case 4 depicts a double FK-RA PS that transitions to a RA PS produced depressed
equilibrium. In this case, power relations are L vs. IK strong, FK vs. IK moderately strong and
FK vs. L weak. These relations provide FK with the ability to aid in the PS but ultimately let L
assume the dominant role.
Given that μ > μ* throughout, the appropriate value of β2 must be considered. On one
hand, β2 = 0 (debt reduction does not reduce C) allows for a more robust economy. On the other
hand, β2 > 0 can be used to mildly bound state variables. Additionally, for β2 ≤ .4, a second cycle
in v occurs after a short transient cycle. As a result, we set β2 = .4.37 The relevance of
deleveraging behavior also suggests that β2 > 0 is realistic.38
Using the same method for determining time increments, one period is approximately .5
years. The resulting double FK-RA PS lasts 25 years until f starts to decline. 39 After that point μ
continues to rise faster than f declines further reducing IK net profits which leads to further
declines in v. The end result is a depressed equilibrium with a state vector of (v=.502, μ=1.04,
f=0, 1-u-f=-.04). The expansion is not sustainable once (1-μ-f) declines more rapidly. Compared
to case 3, the increased power of FK further destabilizes the economy.40

37

All values of β2 in the range 0-1 produce qualitatively similar results except for the second cycle.
In order to clearly present details of interest, the associated graphs, for this case, do not depict the final state
equilibriums.
39
Despite the weak revival in v at that time, the steep decline in IK gross profits forces f to decline.
40
The second (weak) expansion in v occurs after 37 years and is the result of faster increases in μ than declines in
(1-μ-f) which slow around that time.
38
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Starting from the previous nexus of class relations, if FK vs. L is strengthened (via
increases in ρ2 and α2) a double profit squeeze that degenerates into a FK PS crash results as
reported in case 5.41 The time increment is one year. μ increases for 17 years although minimally
from .600 to .613, while f increases continuously at increasing rates. Once μ declines, the steeper
ascent of f dominates and leads to a steeper decline in IK net profit. Eventually, an FK PS crash
takes over with v=u=0 and f and 1-u-f exploding respectively upward and downward.
An additional weakening of L, this time vis a vis IK, a strengthening of IK vs. FK and a
weakening of L vs. FK, leads to an I-led expansion after a brief transient decline in v (case 6). In
order to avoid an explosive outcome, debt financed C is mildly reduced (β2 = .6) to enable underconsumption tendencies to evolve and IK saving out of net profits is introduced (Z1 = .4). The
expansion ends in an undesirable equilibrium with v=.68, μ=.365, f=0, and 1-μ-f=.635. After a
transient increase in c to .74, it declines to .645. Thus, under-consumption tendencies push the
economy to undesirable levels. Further declines in borrowing (β2 = .2) lead to a lower level of
performance (v=.45, μ=0, f=0, 1-μ-f=1) as a result of more serious under-consumption problems.
Finally, case 7 predicated on moderate L vs. IK and weak FK vis a vis IK and L results in
a wage-led42 stable expansion at acceptable state variable levels. The equilibrium vector is (v=1,
μ=.88, f=0, (1-μ-f) =.12).
In sum, more moderate class power relation and a neutralization of FK’s role on the
distribution of income produce more stable and desirable outcomes. Increased FK power and/or

41
42

Given that the rise in μ is limited before declining, β2 is left at its base value of .75.
Technically this is not a wage-led economy because ∂Y/∂µ< 0, but C plays a more prominent role.
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an imbalance in class relations with strong L and strong FK (double PS) result in more instability
and less desirable outcomes.
V. Qualitative Behavior Bounded Three Class Model: From Crashes and Depressed Equilibrium
to Chaos and Cycles
a. Modified Underlying Dynamics
The bounded model adds wealth/bubble dynamics along with restrictions on W behavior,
a wealth effect on expenditures, limitations on f growth and countercyclical government policy.
The most important additions are the limitations placed on both f and W which take the form of
diminishing marginal growth with respect to their main drivers (respectively (1-u) and f).
Returning to the above discussion of a typical expansion, starting in the early-mid
expansion when μ increases, f is still declining, W increases exogenously and (1-μ-f) increases.
Eventually f rises slowly causing W to increase further and (1-μ-f) to decline. Here, the decline
in I is offset by a wealth-induced rise and a µ-induced rise in C and v continues to rise. Without
the f and W interaction, there would be a short cycle where v would decline as a result of
increases in μ. Alternatively, the increase in v allows both f and W to rise further, but at a slow
rate due to limitations and large α0 values. As long as the dual C effect offsets the decrease in I, v
rises but if I dominates, v declines causing μ to decline. If μ falls faster than f increases, (1-μ-f)
may increase for a while, thus continuing the slow expansion. Finally, f rises fast enough so that
(1-μ-f) declines and W is restricted enough such that investment declines dominate and a slow
contraction joins with the fast contraction.
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b. Technical Aspects of the Bounded Model
Three attributes of the four DEQ model in equations (1,2’,3 and 7) contribute to the
qualitative behavior of the system. The model can characterized as: 1) a coupled set of two
nonlinear oscillators with endogenously determined coupling strength; 2) an overall cyclical
environment consisting of two component cycles of which one is a fast cycle and the other a
slow cycle; and 3) two equations of motion (2’ and 7) that are quadratic in state variables
allowing for the possibility of an equilibrium state vector that is not contained in real space (R 4).
These characteristics underlie state solutions ranging from damped cycles to limit cycles to
increasing amplitude limit cycles to bursting and chaotic trajectories.
Examples of coupled oscillators include the synchronized chirping /bio luminescence of
crickets/fire flies.43 In our case v̇ and 𝜇̇ comprise one nonlinear oscillator, while the interaction
between 𝑓̇ and 𝑊̇ the other. The former comprises the RA PS dynamic while the latter implicitly
captures the cycle in asset prices (wealth).44 Abstracting from µ and v movements, exogenous
increases in f in the case where -α0> 0 results in increased trading on secondary markets by FK
causing asset prices to rise. At some point, asset prices rise slowly and eventually decline
causing a cycle in W.

43

A classic physics example is two identical pendulums attached by a spring. Starting from rest, if both pendulums
are moved simultaneously to the left or right without altering spring tension, then the two cyclical trajectories will
have synchronized peaks and synchronized troughs. Alternatively, if the two pendulums are spread apart and
released, the peak (tough) of one cycle is aligned with the tough (peak) of the other. Other joint behavior is also
possible.
44
The FK PS only emerges once both subsystems interact.
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The two oscillators are coupled via their joint dependency. f directly affects µ and v and
W directly impacts v. In return, µ and v affect both f and W. Critical coupling parameters
associated with unit changes in relevant state variables are: α2, ρ2, (1- βL) µ YF, β1vYF, -β1 (µ*µ)YF, 2α3(1-µ)-α1 and the partial derivatives of A with respect to µ and f. It should be noted that
numerous coupling parameters are endogenous. In particular, when µ and v increase
(decrease) relevant coupling parameters increase (decrease) with the exception of the µ effects
on 𝑓̇ which depend on the relative size of α3, α1 and (1-µ). At extreme values of µ, it is possible
for this component of coupling strength to decrease, but for most realistic values coupling
strength increases.
Considering the coupled oscillators as a whole, particularly with respect to key macro
state variables v and W, an interesting aggregate cyclical environment exists. At the same time
that 𝑓̇ and 𝑊̇ equations produce (unsustainable) counteracting tendencies to FK PS and FK-RA
PS crashes, their interaction is responsible for adding a sub harmonic cycle within the overall
unified cycle. In other words, cyclical solutions are actually made up of a fast, fundamental cycle
primarily based on μ and v (RA PS) and a sub-harmonic slow cycle related to f, W, and v
interactions (FK PS). The quadratic terms in 𝑓̇ and 𝑊̇ help establish not only bounded state
trajectories but also a slow cycle.45 The determination of µ in the fast cycle feeds back to the
slow cycle by impacting (1-µ) which influences f and W. Despite mathematicians’ use of
fundamental and subservient descriptors for the two cycles, the secular weakening of L underlies

45

The -α0 term in equation (2’) further reduces the pace of the cycle.
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its fast nature and subservient economic role in overall behavior and the FK PS component
becomes the dominant cycle.
Lastly, the inclusion of quadratic state variables in some DEQs implies that the
equilibrium state vector may include complex conjugate numbers. In this case, an equilibrium
does not exist in real space (R4). Consideration of such equilibriums has only recently become a
topic of interest referred to as hidden attractors (Leonov and Kuznetsov(2013)).
These three characteristics of the bounded model have important implications for the
qualitative behavior of the system. The coupling of two nonlinear oscillators creates the potential
for either two interacting limit cycles or chaotic trajectories. In general, findings on increased
coupling strength suggest that the two cycles/trajectories are more likely to become
synchronized.46 In our context, endogenous increases in coupling strength as v and µ increase
will synchronize cycles in µ, v, and f. Simultaneous increases in µ and f lead to a potent double
profit squeeze with larger amplitudes and a more dramatic reversal. This makes a transition from
an overall limit cycle to limit cycles with larger amplitudes and potential turbulent behavior once
the bounds on state variables are hit more likely.
The aggregated cycle consisting of both a fast and slow cycle, also referred to as a dual
time scale problem, is also a source of potential turbulence. Berge’ et al. (1984; Ch. 9) shows
that the combination of such cycles in general has a tendency to form limit cycle – like behavior
subject to turbulent/chaotic bursts. As a precursor of chaos, Berge’ et al. (1984; p. 249) argue

46

This result is somewhat intuitive. If two qualitatively similar trajectories are only mildly coupled, the potential for
differences in one trajectory to dominate the interaction and alter the overall behavior is more likely. Surprisingly,
this result has been found to hold for two chaotic trajectories (Boccaletti et al. (2002)).
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that the amplitudes of the fundamental (fast) cycle decline while those of the subharmonic (slow)
cycle increase. Starting from a limit cycle as a base solution, if the latter dominates (as in our
case), the same increased amplitude behavior predicted by increased coupling strength emerges.
Berge’ et al. view a turbulent response in this situation as the result of competition between the
driving and restorative system forces that results in unexpected outcomes. This particularly
pertains to our model as the restorative forces have abrupt impacts once they are strong enough
to lower v.
Finally, the recent analysis of non-equilibrium (hidden) attractors (Leonov and
Kuznetsov (2013)) offers another explanation for potential chaotic results. Given the newness of
this research and the lack of general results, we do not pursue this line of research.
These properties of the model suggest that the prospective overall qualitative behavior of
the state variables is likely to experience transitions, typically as a result of bifurcations, from
damped cycles to limit cycles as a base to modified limit cycles characterized by increasing
amplitudes to bursting and chaotic behavior. Focusing more on the disaggregated behavior of
components, we would expect to find two separate limit cycles. One in W,f state space and one
in µ,v state space that combine to form a single aggregate limit cycle with increasing amplitudes.
This result is best viewed in two dimensional phase planes that cross between both coupled
systems: in (µ,f), (v,f), (µ,W) and (v,W) spaces. We also expect, due to endogenous coupling
strength and fast and slow cycles to observe limit cycles with ever increasing amplitudes at
higher values of µ and f. Also, a quick reversal in behavior back to smaller amplitude limit
cycles is likely once the bounds for the system are encountered. This quick reversal in the system
can act as a source for bursting and chaotic behavior. Finally, a far-away view of state
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trajectories should reveal both the fast and slow cycles that underlie the overall cyclical behavior
as demonstrated in Berge’ et al. (1984; p. 249).

c. Qualitative Behavior
In this section, two qualitative behaviors from the unbounded model that are most
relevant to the NL era – FK PS and FK-RA double PS – are analyzed. For each of the two PS,
the cases presented consider a continuum of qualitative behaviors. As just discussed, the
qualitative behavior associated with each PS lies on a continuum from damped cycles to limit
cycles, comprised of a fast and slow cycle, to limit cycles with increasing amplitudes and to
irregular limit cycles that experience chaotic bursts.
All simulations analyzed are reported in Table 4 based on the relative bi-lateral strengths
of the three classes, other model characteristics and key results. Parameter values for each case
are reported in Table 5. Some of the more technical results discussed in the preceding section are
reported in Appendix C.
Parameters in the bounded model are not directly comparable and thus are likely to
deviate from parameters in the unbounded model. Finally, quadratic parameters take on largerthan-life values in order to incorporate a continuous downturn in asset prices/wealth that
typically would take the form of a discontinuous free-fall when a bubble bursts.
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FK PS Results
For the FK PS case, there are two distinct paths leading to the described continuum of
outcomes. There is a bubble chaotic path and a weakened FK path. In the latter case, as FK is
moderately weakened, via decreases in either α1 or α2 or an increase in α3, the FK PS perhaps
unexpectedly becomes a FK-RA PS which exhibits chaos. This result is associated with a large
increase in µ and a moderate increase in f. µ increases more due to the weakening of FK. Now,
smaller changes in

𝑓̇
𝑓

with respect to v occur and relatively

µ̇
µ

via a slow growing ρ2 f term in

equation (1). Both states increase on average as larger v amplitudes more heavily weighted on
the upside result in increases in v driving both µ and f up. Finally, µ and f cycles become
synchronized in a way that further underlies the double PS. In particular, the μ peak aligns with
the trough in f. Thus, as μ declines, f rises such that f increases when μ is still close to its peak
resulting in the double PS. Also, v, μ and W peaks are aligned with the trough in (1-μ-f) allowing
for expenditures and income to remain in near balance even at I and C extremes. This result is
addressed in Case 5.
The bubble path to chaos results from increases (decreases) in W0 (W1). This corresponds
to less bubble prevention mechanisms/institutions. In this scenario, the center point for µ and v
around its fluctuations remain the same, v remains the same but v experiences larger amplitudes.
The timing of v fluctuates and allows for a moderate overall increase in f around its fluctuations
and a moderate decline in (1-μ-f). At the same time W increases substantially by

35

Table 4. Qualitative Behaviors in Bounded Three Class Model
Case
1

L vs. IK
Weak

FK vs. IK
Strong

FK vs. L
Moderate
Strong

Absolute FK

2

Weak

Strong

Increase

3

Weak

Strong

Moderate
Strong
Moderate
Strong

4

Weak

Strong

Increase
Further

5

Strong

Moderate

Moderate
Strong
Strong

6

Moderate

Moderate
Strong

Strong

7

Moderate

Weak

Weak

Increase
More

Outcome
FK PS Damped cycles. Cycles die out after
50 years. Acceptable (unsustainable)
equilibrium. f is large and µ is low.
FK PS limit cycle with v center pt. the same
as ve above. f↑, W↑. Volatility increases.
Limit cycle base with irregular extreme
values departures in v and W. Extreme
values cycle above limit cycle extreme. W↑,
f↑. Volatility increases.
Limit cycle base with upper bursts in W and
v trajectories. f↑, W↑, v↑
Double FK-RA PS with erratic cycles.
W↓,µ↑, f↑ marginally.
FK-RA PS chaotic behavior with significant
volatility. Undesirable v level and
distribution of income.
FK-RA PS damped cycles. Cycles die out at
t=1000. Other characteristics the same as
case 6.

Table 5. Parameter Values for FKPS and FK-RA PS Cases
FKPS
CASE
1
2
3
4
5
FKRA
PS
CASE
1
2

ϒ

ρ1

ρ2

α0

α1

α2

α3

Z0

Z1

Z2

β0

βL

β1

β2

βFK

μ*

W0

W1

W2

Yf

v(0)

μ(0)

f(0)

W(0)

.025

.025

.005

.10

1.7

.25

4.3

100

1.0

.02

1000

.75

.75

.05

.02

.60

.10

.60

5.0

10,
000

.90

.60

.042

27,
000

.47

10,
000

.90

.60

.06

27,
000

1.8
2.95
3.8
.10

.007

.04

.008

.10

.60

.5

4.0

500

1.0

.02

-800

.75

.75

.05

.02

.60

.05

.35

.47

doubling at its center point. Here, the larger wealth effect can propel trajectories beyond their
limit cycle extremum. The continuum of bubble path behavior is presented in Cases 2-4.
FK PS case 1, is summarized in Table 4, depicted in Figure 3 with parameter values listed
in Table 5. Bi-lateral class relations associated with a FK dominated profit-led regime and
relevant for this case are: weak L vs. IK, strong FK vs. IK and moderately strong FK vs. L. The
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stabilizing effects incorporated in the bounded model result in damped cycles with an
equilibrium vector of (v=1.040, μ=.526, f=.199, W=27.4, (1-μ-f) =.275). Given the equilibrium
value of (1-µ-f), the PS is mild. The cycles around ve suggest that further upward bounding is
desirable. The time interval is calculated based on the 76 periods it takes for μ to go from .62 to a
value of .52 +/- .001. Using a 35-year period for such a decline in μ, each time period is
approximately .5 year. The state variables at this juncture are (v=.997, µ=.522, f=.186, (1-µ-f)
=.291). The length of the first two cycles in v from peak to peak are approximately 15 years.
The trajectories capture the secular trends associated with a FK-dominated profit-led
regime: μ declines, f rises, v remains close to full employment after a major crisis, (1-μ-f)
declines and c increases. While the equilibrium for v is desirable, it is predicated on an
undesirable redistribution of income from L and IK to FK. Yet the rise to power of FK is likely
to propel the economy down a path to more unsettled and unsustainable behavior. If FK power is
capable of reducing bubble prevention policy/regulation, a limit cycle or chaos can result (see
cases 2 and 3 below).
In addition, attempts to redistribute income within an investment-led framework requires
careful consideration. Increases in μ and decreases in f must be balanced so as to produce
desirable levels of IK net profits to maintain I and v. Alternatively, a transition to a wage-led
regime requires less constraints on redistribution.
When an asymmetric G (anti-inflation) policy47 is implemented to stabilize v at its upper
bounds (not reported or depicted), equilibrium values remain the same, but a significant number

47

This is the same G policy expressed in equation (6) except that it is only implemented when v > v*.
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of additional cycles prior to equilibrium occur. Thus, this policy is mildly destabilizing
suggesting that a dynamic policy control variable would be more appropriate.
Other qualitative FK PS behaviors for the bounded model are associated with the two
paths to limit cycles and chaotic outcomes. For the bubble path, increases (decreases) in W1 (W2)
lead to this result. As W1 increases from .6, the number of cycles prior to equilibrium increase.
At W1 = 1.8 a limit cycle first appears for all state variables. These trajectories are depicted in
Figure 3, case 2. The absolute rise in FK power increases volatility in the economy, while
increasing f resulting in the following approximate center points for state variables (v=1.040,
µ=.53, f=.27, (1-µ-f) =.10). Even at the initiation of limit cycles, slight irregularities can be seen
at the upper boundaries of the W cycle. These figures are extremely useful for highlighting the
underlying fast cycles (in dark) and slow cycles (in gray) that underlie the limit cycle. As
discussed in section V.b, the declining amplitude of the fast cycle at the same time that slow
cycle amplitudes increase is indicative of an impending transition to chaotic behavior.
As W1 increases further, the irregularities in W become more pronounced and begin to
appear in the upper reaches of other trajectories. At W1 = 2.95, the tops of the v and W
trajectories show cycles above limit cycle extremum (depicted in Fig 3., case 3). At W1 =3.8, the
trajectories take on a spikey look associated with chaotic bursts (Fig 3. case 4).
The other path to chaos via a weakening of FK vs. IK (smaller α1 or α2) results in a
double PS. Starting from FK PS case 1 above, between 1.15 ≤ α1 ≤ 1.7, the number of cycles till
equilibrium increases. For .8 ≤ α1 ≤ 1.1, limit cycles begin in all state trajectories with the W
path exhibiting minor irregularities at its maximum reaches. For α1 ≤ .8, all state trajectories

38

experience limit cycles with irregularities. For α1 = .1, an irregular pattern is clear in all states as
depicted for v and Win figure 3., case 5. Here, a double PS results. The weakening of FK
indirectly strengthens L, while FK maintains moderate strength vs IK. As a result, profits are
squeezed from two directions.
FK-RA PS Results
For the case of strong L vs. IK, moderately strong FK vs. IK and strong FK vs. L, an
underlying limit cycle base made up of fast (RA PS) and slow (FK PS) cycles experiences the
described continuum of behavior. In all cases, a double PS takes place. The parameter values that
serve as the base case reported in Table 5 as case 6, clearly indicate that the FK portion of the
double squeeze dominates. Not only are the f amplitudes more substantial, but the impact of
changes in relevant state variables (µ and v) on f exceed those impacts for µ.
Case 6 considers the chaotic result which is depicted in Figure 3. Average values of state
variables around their cyclical fluctuations are approximately (v=.3, μ=.8, f=.65. W=55, (1-μ-f) =
-.60). The relative strength of L and FK vis a vis IK leads to large income shares for the two
classes and a negative IK share that brings an I-led economy to fluctuate around depressed
levels.
The secular trends are for µ, f, W and c to increase and (1-u-f) and i to decline. The
economy is maintained at inadequate employment levels by rising c as a result of increased L
income and increased wealth-induced C. This outcome is more sustainable that the FK PS
outcome because L debt is not necessary, but the outcome is still dependent on unsustainable
pseudo asset bubbles.
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A key distinction exists in this double PS case with respect to the synchronization of f
and µ. In the FK PS the toughs and peaks of f and µ were aligned. For the FK-RA PS in case 6,
the peaks of both states are virtually synchronized.48 This is predicted by the factors that
influence coupling strength discussed in section V.b.49 Thus, µ and f rise in unison causing the
double PS.
An average level µ> μ* requires consideration of β2 values. For β2 > 0, a drag on C from
debt retirement (deleveraging) operates. In case 1, β2 = .75. Considering the significant role that
consumer deleveraging played in the post 2008 period, this case may be realistic. If β2 ≤ .45, the
qualitative nature of the solution changes to damped cycles.50 Case 7 shows results for β2 = .3.
Here, additional C has a stabilizing effect on volatility but not on the level of the economy
Equilibrium values are similar to the average values above (v=.33, µ=.77, f=.785, W=52, (1-µf)=-.56). Equilibrium is not reached until after 1000 periods. Thus, realistically a cyclical
solution exists. Stabilization of the economy at a desirable v equilibrium requires a careful
redistribution of power. A significant decrease in FK power and a moderate decline in L power
are needed. In an I-led mode, the redistribution must be managed wisely. In order to prevent
unrealistic increases in v, µ and f must be used to temper I activity to bound v.

48

The occurrence of µ and f peaks for seven arbitrarily chosen time periods are respectively t=21,23; t=77,80;
t=123,126; t=203,207; t=509,511; t=594,597; and t=903,905.
49
The higher values, but not extreme values, of µ in the latter case likely increase coupling strength more than
lower values of v decrease it. Thus, more synchronization is expected.
50
Between.3< β2<.75 the continuum of behavior described above is experienced.
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Figure 3. Bounded Model Cases

CASE 1. FK PS DAMPED CYCLE

CASE 2. FK PS LIMITED CYCLE

CASE 3. FK PS ERATIC LIMIT CYCLE/CHAOS

CASE 4. FK PS ERATIC LIMITED CYCLE/CHAOS
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CASE 5. WEAKENED FK TRANSITION TO DOUBLE PS

CASE 6. FK-RA PS CHAOS

CASE 7. FK-RA PS DAMPED CYCLE
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The addition of a symmetric G policy (with β2 = .75), also produces damped cycles with
the same unacceptable equilibrium vector. The number of cycles until equilibrium increases in
this case. β2 = 0 does not alter this solution (not reported).
VI. Sensitivity Analysis
Results of a sensitivity analysis are reported in Appendix D, Tables D.1 and D.2
respectively for the FK PS and FK-RA PS solutions and are summarized here. Sensitivity
analysis determines the robustness of chaotic behavior discussed above and it highlights which
parameters are related to the continuum from damped cycles to limit cycles to limit cycle with
irregularities to chaos.
For the FK PS case, the continuum from damped cycles (base case) to more volatile
outcomes are related to increases in W0, W1, α3 and βL and decreases in α1, α2 and W2, while for
the most part Z1, Z2 and βFK values do not alter the damped cycle result. The impact of W0 and βL
influence volatility resulting from excess demand, W1 and W2 increase the absolute power of FK
and thus the intensity of the PS and α1 – α3 weaken FK pushing the solution to a double PS. In
the latter case, FK power is only moderately reduced while at the same time L is strengthened vs.
FK. One key insight is that unbalanced power relations are responsible for the lack of stability in
the economy.
Altering one parameter at a time, chaotic results are shown to exist for the following
parameter ranges: .3≤ W0≤.89, W1>.22, .17<W2≤.6, .32≤ βL≤.99, 0≤ α1≤1.15, and 5.3≤ α3≤7.85.
These results are robust over a wide parameter range related to the FK PS and double PS.
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For the double PS, the path to less stable solutions is related to increases in ρ1, α1, α2, W0,
W1, W2, Z2, βL, βFK and decreases in γ, ρ2, α0, α3 and β1. The impact of γ, ρ1 and ρ2 strengthen
labor’s ability to squeeze profits, the α0 – α3 and W0 – W2 effects strengthen FK either absolutely
or vis a vis IK and thus the FK PS component. The βL, βFK, β1 and Z2 effects increase demand
volatility. Chaotic parameter ranges are much more narrow in this case: .0062≤γ≤.0073,
.039<ρ1≤.05, .007≤ρ2≤.009, .09≤α0≤.1, .55≤α1<.65, .49≤α2≤.5, 3.4≤α3≤4.1, .04≤W0≤.057,
.01≤W1≤.38, .3≤W2≤.57, .018≤Z2≤.027, .74≤βL≤.8, .65≤β1≤.82, and .0143≤βFK≤.055. Despite
this narrow range, the parameter band for other types of volatile behavior is wide. In addition,
the sensitivity analysis for the W1 parameter indicates that a second chaotic parameter space is
likely to exist.
VII. Conclusion
This paper develops a three-class predator-prey model for the behavior of the macro economy.
The nexus of class relations between labor, industrial capitalists and financial capitalists captures
important struggles over the distribution of income observed during the neoliberal era. Financial
capitalists are added to the typical capital-labor interaction and are modelled as super-predators.
In this role, financial capitalists are shown to be responsible for a finance capitalist-induced
profit squeeze.
The basic model employed is a three-differential equation model. The unsustainable
nature of neoliberal macro dynamics that resulted in the Great Recession is captured by the basic
model. A key result is that unregulated finance capital has devastating impacts on the economy –
a financial profit squeeze crash. This result is quite plausible in a three species/class model, as an
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unregulated super-predator can easily mismanage the population of the other two classes. I refer
to this as the FK paradox.
An extended model that incorporates bounding mechanisms, most importantly wealth
effects capable of sustaining consumption behavior during significant reductions in labor share
of income, shows that a continuum of undesirable behavior from chaotic bursts to irregular limit
cycles to damped cycles often at depressed levels of economic activity characterize the behavior
of the economy. Even the more desirable of these outcomes are propped up by unsustainable
consumption demand from pseudo asset-price bubble-induced wealth effects.
The main conclusions of the study are that increases in the relative and/or absolute power
of financial capitalists lead to increases instability, unregulated finance underlies the financial
capitalist paradox, and in general unbalanced power relations among the three classes, depending
on its particular nexus, results in various crisis generating mechanisms ranging from financial
capitalist, reserve army or double profit squeezes to under-consumption problems.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Data Sources

A.

Stylize Facts

µ: Labor share of income.
Shares of gross domestic income: Compensation (pay and benefits) of employees, paid
Percent, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Linearly interpolated to quarterly data
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Shares of gross domestic income: Compensation of employees, paid [A4002E1A156NBEA], retrieved from
FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A4002E1A156NBEA, December 10, 2019.
(1-µ): Profit share of income . NFC Profit Share Variables
All variants of the profit share are constructed from NIPA Table 1.14 with the exception of the net new
equity issues adjustment which comes from Flow of Funds data table F.102, line 39. NIPA line numbers
appear in parentheses, while the F.102 line numbers are in square brackets.
(1-µ)= net operating surplus (24) + taxes on production & imports (less subsidies) (23)
net value added (19).
(1-µ-f): net profit share= (1-u) – net dividends (30) + net new equity issues [39]
net value added (19)

Consumption share of income
Personal Consumption Expenditures:
Nominal Consumption: Personal Consumption Expenditures
Billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted.
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures [PCE], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCE, December 6, 2019.

C: Real personal consumption expenditures:
C= RPCE
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
Federal Reserve Economic Data - https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCECC96
Billions of Chained 2012 Dollars
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
C Share: C/RGDP, where
Y: RGDP
Real Gross Domestic Product
Billions of Chained 2012 Dollars
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
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https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1
W: Real US Wealth = (USWEALTH/PCECTPI)* 100
USWEALTH :All sectors; U.S. wealth, Level
Millions of Dollars – converted to billions
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOGZ1FL892090005Q
I: Real investment: (NFCGFI/IDEFLATOR)* 100
Nonfinancial business; gross fixed investment, nonresidential structures, equipment, and intellectual property products, Flow
Millions of Dollars – converted to billions of dollars
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOGZ1FA145013005Q
IDEFLATOR
Investment deflator
Real private fixed investment: Nonresidential (chain-type price index)
Index 2012=100, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/B008RG3Q086SBEA
C-I RATIO
Real personal consumption expenditure/real nonfinancial corporate gross fixed investment

B.

Econometric Estimation of Behavioral Relations

µ, 1-µ, 1-µ-f, W, C, I, Y as defined above.
v: Degree of full employment: 1-UN3 or 1-UN6 where
UN3
Unemployment Rate U3 - Civilian Unemployment Rate
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Release: Employment Situation
Seasonally Adjusted, Quarterly
Aggregation Method: Average
Units: Percent – changed to decimal
Notes:

Persons 16 years of age and older.

Limitations: only until 2011, seasonally adjusted
UN6
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Unemployment Rate U6 - Total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic
reasons
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Federal Reserve Economic Data - https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/U6RATE
Percent, Monthly - converted to quarterly (average)
Seasonally Adjusted, monthly

RBAA: BAA – percentage change in IDEFLATOR
BAA
Title:

Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield

Source:

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Seasonal Adjustment: Not Applicable
Frequency:

Quarterly

Aggregation Method: Average
Units:

Percent

RPRIME: MPRIME – percentage change in PCECPTPI (below)
MPRIME
Title: Bank Prime Loan Rate
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Units: Percent
Frequency: Monthly – Converted to quarterly (average)
Seasonal Adjustment: Not Applicable
PCECTPI
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index
Index 2012=100, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCECTPI
CPI
Consumer Price Index: All Items Excluding Food and Energy for the United States,
Index 2015=100,
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Federal Reserve Economic Data - https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USACPICORQINMEI
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RNFCDEBT: (NFCDEBT/IDEFLATOR)* 100
NFCDEBT
Nonfinancial corporate business; debt securities and loans; liability, Level
Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BCNSDODNS

RCONCR: (CONCR/ PCECTPI)* 100
CONCR
Households and nonprofit organizations; consumer credit; liability, Level
Billions of Dollars, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HCCSDODNS

PCFINOP: Percentage change in FINOP.
FINOP: Chinn and Ito (2008); p.31 develop an annual financial openness index ( an inverse measure of the extent of capital controls) that
“codify the tabulations of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF’s annual report on exchange arrangements and
exchange rates, restrictions on both current and capital account transactions, and the required surrender of export proceeds. The index is
calculated for a subset of 20 industrialized countries contained in the panel data set for 181 countries. The data is available at
[http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito website.htm] .
The index for industrialized countries is constructed as described in Bezreh and Goldstein (2013; pp. 22-23.

STOCKPR
Total share prices for all shares for the U. S.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Total Share Prices for All Shares for the United States [SPASTT01USM661N],
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SPASTT01USM661N, December 15, 2019.

PCSTOCKPR

Calculated as the percentage change of the above index.
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Appendix B. Econometric Estimation of Model Parameters

The parameters of behavioral equations in the bounded model are estimated using a quasi-first difference
(Cochrane-Orcutt) regression method of correct for autocorrelated residuals. In addition, robust standard errors
are used for inferences. No corrections for endogeneity or non-stationarity with exception of including a
deterministic linear time trend when relevant are applied.
Differential equations (1, 2’, and 7) are estimated using the percentage change respectively in µ, f and W
as the dependent variables. Given that the only parameter in the DEQ for v is endogenous, this equation does not
require estimation. Independent variables are made up of the RHS variables in the three equations and additional
controls when relevant and available. Independent variables for the three DEQs are respectively (f,v), ((1-µ), (1-µ)2,
v, PCFINOP, PCSTOCKPR, TIME), and (f, f2, µY/W, (µ*-µ)Y/W, RBAA, PCSTOCKPR) where PCFINOP is the percentage
change in an index of financial openness (liberalization) in industrialized nations, PCSTOCKPR is the percentage
change in US stock prices and RBAA is the real yield on BAA bonds. All variable definitions and data sources are in
Appendix A.
The behavioral equations for C and I (equations (4 and 5)), are estimated using respectively the following
RHS variables: ((1-µ)Y, (µ*- µ)Y, W, fY, TIME, RPRIME, RCONCR) and ((1-µ-f)Y, W, RBAA, RNFCDEBT,TIME) where
RPRIME is the prime rate, RCONCR is real consumer credit and RNFCDEBT is NFC real debt. To meet the parameter
restriction Z1 = 1, the dependent variable used in the I equation is I-((1-µ-f)Y).
Econometric results are reported in Table B.1 only for parameters associated with the model. Ninety-five
percent confidence intervals are reported for each parameter. Asterisks denote when parameters are two-tail and
one-tail significant respectively as (**) and (*). It should be noted that for variables that are one-tail significant,
intervals with contain positive and negative values despite being significant.
Given the artificial use of quadratic components in the f and W DEQs to capture what is essentially
discontinuous behavior in a continuous model, the estimation of quadratic parameters focuses more on realistic
critical values of 1-µ and f where respectively ∂f/∂(1-µ) = 0 and ∂W/∂f = 0 than the varied combination of
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parameter values consistent with those critical values. As a result, I report confidence intervals for the critical
values determined by the nonlinear combination of quadratic parameters that meet the above derivative
conditions. Confidence intervals are determined using the Delta Method. Individual parameter values in these
cases are not reported.
In addition, the β0 and Z0 parameters are employed to create an initial environment where E<>Y. Thus,
parameter value assignment in these cases may not be contained in estimated intervals.
Quarterly data is used over the period 1980:1 to 2010:4. Various subsamples are employed that eliminate
the early 1980 recession and/or the Great Recession. The particular sample employed in each case is reported in
Table B.1.
The results in Table B.1. show that the critical values associated with the f and W DEQs are realistic. In
particular, the point estimate for the critical f value in the W equation is .0358 with a maximum value of .0694
implying that once f reaches these values, the f effect on W supposedly through asset prices turns negative. In
comparison, the implied critical f value for FK PS Case 1 in Table 5 is .06. The critical (1-µ) value in the estimated f
DEQ has a point estimate of .321 and a maximum value of .614. In comparison, the critical (1-µ) value for the same
FK PS case is .20 which is contained within the confidence interval.
One issue with the econometric results is that despite key parameters being significant, estimates are not precise.
Even in significant cases, confidence intervals are large. In addition, the f DEQ estimates with the exception of the
critical (1-µ) value are insignificant and intervals are even larger. Also, estimates of the W effect in C are on the low
side. This is likely the result of not capturing the indirect effects of W on debt acquisition and thus C.
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Table B.1.
Eq./
Sample

ϒ

ρ1

ρ2

µ DEQ
1984:1
2010:4

-.161 to
-.008
**

.008 to
.171
**

-.019 to
.013

f DEQ
1980:1
2007:4
w/
TIME

α0

α2

(1-µ)*

-12.6 to
13.4

-10.2 to
3.34

.029 to
.614
**

Z0

Z1

Z2

β0

βL

β1

β2

W DEQ
1980:1
2007:4
w/
TIME
C
1984:1
2007:4

I
1984:1
2010:4
w/TIME

61.3 to
858.4
**

-3157.0
to
-482
**

1
Restrict
-ed

.669 to
.909
**

.404 to
1.15
**

βFK

W0

f*

.018 to
.150
**

.0022
to
.069
**

.0002
to
.0113
**

.001 to
.070
**
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Appendix C. FK-RA PS detailed analysis of Case 6 Figure 3.
This appendix presents a more detailed analysis of the double profit squeeze simulation found in
Figure 3, Case 6. The details presented here demonstrate model predictions contained in section 5.b. On
the technical aspects of the model with the exception of a depiction of the fast and slow cycles which
are evident from the state trajectories in Figure 3, Cases 2-4 and to a lesser extent Case 6. One detail to
notice in the depiction of slow and fast cycles in Fig. 3 is as the fast cycle amplitude declines the slow
cycle amplitude increases. This result is a precursor of a chaotic outcome.
The first set of graphs repeats the state trajectories depicted in Fig. 3, Case 6. The second set of
graphs demonstrates how the trajectories are sensitive to changes in initial conditions. It should be
noted that state variables follower by “bar” in graph titles refer original variables normalized by µ(0)=.6.
Thus vbar= v/.6, wbar= wealth/.6 etc. The original trajectories are black and the trajectories associated
with a unit change in the fifth decimal place of the four state variable initial conditions appear in red.
The third set of graphs are a sampling of the two-dimensional phase-plane plots associated with
the four state variables. As described in section 5.b , phase plots associated with two states within the
same sub-system (nonlinear oscillator) exhibit limit cycle trajectories that either increase or decrease in
amplitude as both states rise. For a state variable pair that crosses between sub-systems, in addition to
changing amplitudes there appears a sharp reversal path that eventually ends up at a small amplitude
limit cycle trajectory. This reversal occurs when the boundaries of state space are reached and the direct
path back represents a dramatic change in behavior that can produce unexpected behavior.
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Appendix D. Sensitivity Analysis Results
Table D.1. Sensitivity Analysis Results: FK PS Model
FKPS
PARAMETER
Base/Case 1
α1
ϒ
ρ1
ρ2
α0
α2
α3

Z1

Z2
βL
β1
βFK
W0
W1
W2

QUALITATIVE BEHAVIOR BY PARAMETER RANGE
Damped Cycles (DC)
1.15≤ α1<1.7 DC MC. (µ,f,W)↑. .8≤ α1<1.15 LC-MI (v,W), (µ,f,W)↑. .3≤ α1<.8 LCIREG (ALL), (µ,f,W)↑. 0< α1<.3 LC-CB.
.025< ϒ≤.055 DC-LESS (µ,f)↓, (v,W)↑. .055≤ ϒ<.07 MS-OOB. ϒ≥.07 INT. .007≤
ϒ<.025 DC-MC, (µ,f)↑, (v,W)↓. ϒ<.007 OOB.
.025< ρ1≤.038 DC-MC (f, µ)↑, (v,W)↓. .038< ρ1≤.091 LC ρ1>.091 M-MIX. .01≤
ρ1<.025 DC-LESS. ρ1<.01 INT.
.005< ρ2≤.26 DC-LESS, v↑. ρ2≥.27 INT
.1< α0≤.42 DC-MC, (W, µ)↑. α0>.42 M-MIX OOB. 0< α0<.1 DC-LESS, (W, µ)↓
.25< α2≤.5 DC-LESS, (µ,f,W)↓. α2>.5 INT. .15< α2<.25 DC-MC, .1< α2<.15 LC, .08<
α2≤.15 LC-IREG. .02<α2≤.08 INT. α2≤.02 M-MIX OOB
3.5< α3<4.3 DC-LESS, (µ,W,f)↓. 2.2< α3<3.5 INT. 1.5< α3<2.2 MS-OOB. 4.3< α3≤5.3
DC-MC, (W,µ)↑. 5.3< α3≤5.7 LC-MI (W). 5.7< α3≤6.2 LC-IREG (ALL). 6.2< α3≤7.85
LC-CB. α3>7.85 MIX CYCLES TO EQUIL.
1≤Z1<1.6 DC-LESS f↑, W↓. Z1≥1.6 MS µ,f, EX v,W OOB. .85< Z1<1 DC-MC W↑, .85≤
Z1<.835 LC-MI W. .835≤ Z1<.8 IREG CYC-EX OOB. .8< Z1≤.6 EX CYC. Z1<.6 IREG
CYC&MS OOB
.02≤ Z2≤.54 DC-MC, Z2>.55 MIX-SC OOB-TR. 0< Z2<.02 DC v,W↑
.75≤ ΒL<.88 DC-LESS. .88≤ ΒL≤.99 DC-IREG OOB-TR. .54≤ ΒL<.75 DC-MC. .33≤ ΒL<.54
LC-MI WIDE. 0< ΒL<.33 LC-IREG. µ,f,W↑
.75< β1<1 DC-LESS W↓v↑. 0< β1<.75 DC-MC W↑
.02≤ βFK<1 DC-LESS W↓. 0≤ βFK<.02 DC-MC
.1< W0<.25 DC-MC f,v,W↑. .25≤ W0<.3 LC f,v,W↑. .3≤ W0<.75 LC-MI WIDE. .75≤
W0<.9 LC-IREG CHAOS WIDE. W0≥.9 MIX OOB-TR INT. 0< W0<.1 DC-LESS f,W↓
ALREADY REPORTED IN TEXT.
W2>5 DC-LESS f,W↓. .8< W2<5 DEC-MC f,W,v↑. .5≤ W2≤.8 LC v,W↑. .25< W2<.5
LC-MI WIDE. .17≤ W2≤.25 CHAOS. W2<<.17 MIX OOB-TR

Legend:
CB: Chaotic burst

DC: Damped cycle

EX: Explosive

INT: integration failure after relatively small number of periods IREG: Irregular/erratic behavior
LC: Limit cycle

LESS: Less cycles before equil.

MC: more cycles before equil. MI: Minor Irregularities

MIX: mixture of stable and unstable
MREG: more regular

MS: monotonically stable

OOB: at least one state out of bounds.

TR: trivial equilibrium

WIDE: widespread behavior across state variables

↑: increases

↓: decreases
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Table D.2. Sensitivity Analysis Results: FK-RA PS Model
FK-RA PS
PARAMETER
Base/Case 1
α1
ϒ
ρ1
ρ2
α0
α1
α2
α3
Z1
Z2
βL
β1
βFK
W0
W1
W2

QUALITATIVE BEHAVIOR BY PARAMETER RANGE
Chaotic oscillations
1.15≤ α1<1.7 DC MC. (µ,f,W)↑. .8≤ α1<1.15 LC-MI (v,W), (µ,f,W)↑. .3≤ α1<.8 LCIREG (ALL), (µ,f,W)↑. 0< α1<.3 LC-CB.
.0063≤ ϒ≤.0073. Chaos. 0074≤ ϒ<.008. MIX. .009≤ϒ≤.04 DC-LESS .05≤ ϒ≤.12 MSOOB. ϒ>.12 MIX INT OOB.
.04≤ ρ1≤.049 CHAOS. .05< ρ1<.08 IREG CYC TO EQ. ρ1≥.08 MIX OOB-TR. .039≤
ρ1<.04 DC TO LC. .02≤ρ1<.039 DC-LESS. .007≤ρ1<.02 DC-LESS OOB. ρ1<.007 MS OOB
.007≤ ρ2≤.009 CHAOS. .01≤ρ2≤.06 DC-LESS. .06<ρ2<.1 DC-LESS OOB. .1≤ ρ2≤.4 MS
OOB. ρ2>.4 INT OOB. .005≤ ρ2<.007 DC-MC OOB. ρ2<.005 MIX OOB-TR
.097≤ α0≤.13 CHAOS. .13<α0<.19 DC-LESS OOB. α0>.19 MS or MIX OOB.
.097<α0≤.09 IREG CYC & MIX. .09< α0<.01 MIX. α0<.01 INT
.565≤ α1<.64 CHAOS. .65≤ α1≤.8 MIX. α1>.8 INT. .565< α1≤.07 IREG LC to LC to OOB.
0≤ α1<.07 IREG CYC or MIX CYC.
.49≤ α2≤.5 CHAOS. .5<α2≤ 1.1 DC-LESS. 1.1α2<3 MS. α2>3 INT, α2<.49 MIX OOB.
3.4< α3<4.1 CHAOS. 4.1< α3<5.5 MIX OOB. 5.5< α3<6.5 MIX w/ CYC. α3>6.5 MON
MIX. α3≤3.4 DC-LESS.
.99≤Z1≤1. CHAOS. 1<Z1≤1.5 DC-LESS. .75< Z1<.99 MIX OOB. Z1<.75 INT.
.018≤ Z2≤.027 CHAOS. Z2>.027 MIX. 0.006≤ Z2<.018 LC. Z2<.006 DC-MC.
.74≤ ΒL≤.8 CHAOS to IREG LC. .8< ΒL≤.99 DC-LESS. .65≤ ΒL<.73 MIX OOB. ΒL<.65 INT
.7< β1≤.85 CHAOS. .86< β1<.99 MIX. .5≤ ΒL<.7 LC. ΒL<.5 DC-LESS.
.0001≤ βFK<.06 CHAOS. .06< βFK<.25 MIX. βFK>.25 INT
.04< W0<.055 CHAOS. .055 <W0<.14 MIX . W0≥.14 INT. .02≤ W0<.045 LC-IREG to LC.
W0<.02 DC-LESS.
.33≤ W1≤.38 CHAOS. .39≤ W1≤.49 MIX-OOB. .03< W1≤.33 IREG LC to LC to IREG LC.
.02< W1≤.01 CHAOS.
.4≤W2≤.57 CHAOS. W2>.57 MIX. .2< W2≤.4 IREG LC to LC. .1< W2<.2 MIX . W2<.1
INT-OOB.
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